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CALIFORNIA'S DETORTIFICATION I OF CONTRACT
LAW: IS THE SEAMAN'S TORT DEAD?
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1984, when the California Supreme Court crafted the new tort
of bad faith denial of contractual existence in Seaman's Direct Buying
Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. ,2 California courts have grappled with a
tort that is fundamentally out of place in the commercial setting.' Since
the inception of this tort, lower courts have fixed numerous limitations
on it in an effort to suppress its punitive damages remedy in commercial
contract actions.4 Recently, the court in DuBarry International v. South-
west Forest Industries5 so severely limited the application of the Sea-
man's tort to commercial contract disputes6 that the tort almost ceases to
exist.
This Comment examines the birth of the tort of bad faith denial of
contractual existence7 and the significance of traditional tort and con-
tract law when applying this tort.' Next, this Comment highlights the
trend in California law toward limiting the tort's application.9 Finally,
1. The "tortification of contract law" is the tendency of contract disputes to "metastasize
into torts," giving rise to punitive damages. Old Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, 872 F.2d 312,
315 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., concurring). This tendency was exhibited by the California
Supreme Court's decision in Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal.
3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
California is the leading state involved in the controversy over the Seaman's tort of bad
faith denial of contractual existence. California's decision regarding the future application of
the Seaman's tort will undoubtedly affect the treatment of similar torts throughout the nation.
See Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., 708 F.2d 385, 399-400 (9th
Cir. 1983). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that district courts should await
"further guidance from the California courts" before extending the tort of bad faith. Id at
400.
2. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
3. See, eg., Elxsi v. Kukje Am. Corp., 672 F. Supp. 1294, 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1987);
DuBarry Int'l v. Southwest Forest Indus., 231 Cal. App. 3d 552, 571-72, 282 Cal. Rptr. 181,
192-93 (1991); Rogoff v. Grabowski, 200 Cal. App. 3d 624, 628-29, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185, 188
(1988).
4. See infra notes 79-148 and accompanying text.
5. 231 Cal. App. 3d 552, 282 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1991).
6. Commercial contracts are those into which parties enter for a business or economic
advantage. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 1.2, at 7 (1982).
7. See infra notes 11-35 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 71-152 and accompanying text.
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this Comment proposes the elimination of the Seaman's tort as a means
of recovery in commercial contract disputes.10
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Seaman's Case
In 1971 Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. ("Seaman's"), a ship
supply dealer, planned to expand its operation by leasing an area in the
City of Eureka's new marina for a marine fuel dealership."I Under pres-
sure from the City to produce written evidence of a contract with an oil
supplier, Seaman's negotiated with Standard Oil Company ("Standard"),
explaining its need for a written agreement. 2 In 1972, after reaching an
agreement on all major points, Standard wrote Seaman's a letter describ-
ing the terms of its proposal.' Seaman's presented the letter to the City,
and the City granted the lease. 4
By the end of the year, however, the 1973-1974 oil crisis had
abruptly changed the oil industry from a buyer's market to a seller's mar-
ket. 5 Consequently, the price of oil rose dramatically.' 6 In 1973 Stan-
dard informed Seaman's that due to a federal allocation program
instituted by the Federal Energy Office, Standard would be unable to
supply fuel to Seaman's. 7 Seaman's wrote to the federal agency and was
10. See infra notes 189-204 and accompanying text.
11. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 759, 686 P.2d
1158, 1160, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 356 (1984).
12. Id
13. Standard proposed:
(1) to sign a Chevron Marine Dealer agreement with Seaman's for an initial term of
10 years; (2) to advance Seaman's the cost of the new fueling facilities, or up to
$75,000, which sum was to be amortized over the life of the agreement at the rate of
one cent per gallon of oil; (3) to provide a 4.5 cent discount per gallon off the posted
price of fuel; and (4) to sign an agreement providing for Standard's right to cure in
case of default by Seaman's.
Id at 760, 686 P.2d at 1160-61, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 356-57. Standard's letter concluded:
"'[Tlhis offer is subject to our mutual agreement on the specific wording of contracts to be
drawn, endorsement and/or approval by governmental offices involved, and continued ap-
proval of Seaman's credit status at the time the agreements are to go into effect.'" Id, 686
P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357. Seaman's considered the signing of the letter by agents of
both Seaman's and Standard a "momentous occasion." Id
14. Id. After receiving the letter, Seaman's informed Mobil Oil Company that a contract
had been signed with Standard and ended negotiations it had been conducting with Mobil. Id
15. See Brian Beedham, Look Beyond the Oil, THE ECONOMIST, May 17, 1975, at 7 (dis-
cussing nationwide impact of 1973-1974 fuel shortage).
16. Id
17. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 761, 686 P.2d at 1161, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 357. In January of
1973, however, Standard and Seaman's had signed a temporary agreement in which Standard
promised to supply Seaman's with all the fuel it needed while the new marina was under
construction. Id In telephone conversations with Seaman's, Standard said that the federal
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successful in receiving a supply order. 8 Standard, however, changed its
position by denying it ever had a binding agreement with Seaman's. 19
Two appeals to the federal agency followed.20 First, Standard ap-
pealed the supply order and succeeded in reversing it.2 ' Seaman's then
appealed this reversal, and the federal agency agreed to reinstate the or-
der on the condition that Seaman's file a copy of a court decree stating
that a valid contract existed.22 Seaman's explained to Standard that it
could not afford a trial to prove the existence of a contract and asked
Standard to stipulate to the existence of one.23 In response, Standard's
representative laughed and said, "see you in court."'24 Without a supply
contract, Seaman's could not fulfill its obligation to the City, and the
company went out of business.2"
Seaman's sued Standard for breach of contract and for tortious
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.26 The jury
returned a verdict for Seaman's on both counts.27 Seaman's received the
same amount of compensatory damages for breach of contract and for
tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and
received approximately twenty-eight times that amount in the form of
punitive damages for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.28
regulations were the only barrier to the contract. Id. Standard even helped Seaman's by pro-
viding the forms necessary for Seaman's to obtain a supply authorization from the federal




21. I, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358. Seaman's reacted to Standard's appeal by
writing to Standard and requesting an explanation of its actions. Id Standard did not write
back. Id. Instead, internal memoranda revealed that one of Standard's agents reacted to the
reversal of the order by exclaiming, "'[g ]reatl We are recommending to other divisions] that
they follow your example.'" Id
22. Id.
23. Id. at 761-62, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
24. Id. at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
25. Id.
26. Id. Seaman's also sued for fraud and interference with Seaman's contractual relation-
ship with the City. At trial, Seaman's won on all but the fraud cause of action. Id
27. The jury awarded compensatory damages of $397,050 for breach of contract and com-
pensatory damages of $397,050 for tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Id The punitive damage award for tortious breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing amounted to $11,058,810. Id In addition, the jury awarded com-
pensatory damages of $1,588,260 for intentional interference with an advantageous business
relationship and punitive damages of $11,058,8 10 for intentional interference with an advanta-
geous business relationship. Id
28. Id.
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On appeal, the California Supreme Court found it "unnecessary ''29
to decide the "broad" question of when a breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing30 in a commercial contract may give rise to
a tort action.31 Instead, the court created a new tort that occurs if, "in
addition to breaching the contract, [a party to the contract] seeks to
shield itself from liability by denying, in bad faith and without probable
cause, that the contract exists."' 32 The court's rationale was that ac-
cepted notions of business ethics are offended when a contracting party
seeks to avoid all liability on a meritorious contract claim and essentially
denies that a contract exists3  by adopting a "stonewall ' 34 position. The
court concluded, without explanation, that imposing tort damages in
these situations is "not likely to intrude upon the bargaining relationship
or upset reasonable expections [sic] of the contracting parties."
31
29. Id at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
30. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
performance and its enforcement." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
The Uniform Commercial Code defines good faith as "honesty in fact in the conduct or trans-
action concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1991). Conduct such as "subterfuge" or "evasion"
violates the duty of good faith and fair dealing. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 6, § 7.17, at
527.
31. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363. The court did
not provide an explanation for its evasion of this issue, concluding instead that "it is not even
necessary to predicate liability on a breach of the implied covenant." Id. The California
Court of Appeal, by contrast, decided the issue by explaining that no tort cause of action
existed for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a commercial
contract. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 181 Cal. Rptr. 126, 136
(1982), vacated, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984); see also Air-Sea
Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1989) (criticizing failure of Seaman's
court to explain reason new tort was invented).
The Air-Sea court explained:
Indeed, the Seaman's court's failure to explain why it was not necessary to predicate
its holding on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or to justify the
dramatically greater liability for the bad faith denial of the existence of a contract as
compared to the bad faith dispute of a contract's terms, undoubtedly spawned the
confusion in the appellate division cases ....
Id at 184 n. 11 (citation omitted).
32. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
33. Id
34. There has been much discussion among California's appellate courts as to whether the
Seaman's court intended "stonewalling" to be an example of tortious conduct that breaches
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, or whether it actually intended to create a specific
new tort of bad faith denial of the existence of a contract. See infra notes 79-130 and accompa-
nying text. Standard's stonewalling was its statement, "[s]ee you in court." 36 Cal. 3d at 762,
686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358. The court interpreted this statement as indicating that
Standard was seeking to avoid all liability in bad faith, that is, without a belief in the viability
of its defense. Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
35. Id.
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B. Tort and Contract Law Policy Differences
Imposing tort damages upon contracting commercial parties as a
result of economically justified business decisions is inconsistent with
principles of contract law.36 The objectives underlying the remedies in
tort and contract law are widely divergent.37 Whereas the goal of con-
tract actions is to enforce the intentions of the parties to the agreement,38
the goal of tort law is primarily to vindicate "social policy."3 9 Thus,
punitive damages are traditionally extreme in order to punish and deter
the wrongdoer, while contract damages are usually compensatory, al-
lowing the plaintiff to recover only that which he or she has lost.' Puni-
tive damages are generally justified if an unsophisticated contracting
party reasonably relies on a sophisticated contracting party for the pro-
tection of its interests.4 For this reason, punitive damages attempt to
discourage intentional injury to parties that are in a more vulnerable po-
sition than the parties with whom they contract.42 In contract law, how-
ever, intentional breach is not discouraged if it provides the promisor a
more economically efficient solution.43
There are several important reasons for excluding punitive damages
from the realm of commercial contracts.' 4 First, punitive damages tradi-
tionally have been justified when the conduct involved "some element of
outrage similar to that usually found in crime."' 45 A business acting on
behalf of its own self-interest by accepting liability in place of economi-
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 30, ch. 16 introductory note
at 100.
37. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 683, 765 P.2d 373, 389, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211, 227 (1988).
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 613 (4th ed.
1971) (stating that duties of conduct that give rise to tort actions are based primarily upon
social policy).
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 30, § 355 cmt. a. "The
purposes of awarding contract damages is [sic] to compensate the injured party .... In excep-
tional instances, departures have been made from this general policy... notably in situations
involving consumer transactions or arising under insurance policies." Id; see also PROSSER,
supra note 39, § 2, at 9 (stating that goals of punitive damages are punishment and deterrence).
41. See Eileen A. Scallen, Sailing the Uncharted Seas of Bad Faith: Seaman's Direct Buy-
ing Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 69 MiNN. L. REv. 1161, 1198 (1985); see also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTS, supra note 30, § 355 cmt. a (noting that punitive damages
may be recoverable in situations arising under insurance policies).
42. See Scallen, supra note 41, at 1187.
43. See RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 30, ch. 16 introductory note
at 100.
44. See infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1979); see also Thomas A. Dia-
mond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: When, If at All, Should It Be Extended
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cally inefficient performance can hardly be called criminal.4 6 In fact,
such conduct is encouraged because "[b]ad faith breach of contract, if
defined as an intentional breach motivated by crass economic self-inter-
est, has been, despite a clamoring of moral credos to the contrary, a judi-
cially accepted staple of our system of commercial law."'47 Our system
commends "bad faith" breaches of commercial contracts because they
may promote economic efficiency: The promisor's pecuniary gains from
the breach may exceed its liability to the promisee for its losses the prom-
isor caused.48 Adding punitive damages to the promisor's liability would
discourage the efficient reallocation of society's resources.49
Second, a party to a commercial contract normally can turn to the
marketplace to replace necessary goods not delivered by a breaching
seller.50 Therefore, the victim of bad faith conduct in a commercial con-
Beyond Insurance Transactions?, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 425, 427 n.7 (1981) (stressing difference
between bad faith and malevolent state of mind required for punitive damages).
Professor Diamond explained:
Punitive damages are not an essential concomitant of defendant's tortious conduct.
The bad faith required ... is not necessarily tantamount to the malevolent state of
mind required for punitive damages. The terms "good faith" and "bad faith" ... are
not meant to connote the absence or presence of positive misconduct of a malicious
or immoral nature-considerations which... are more properly concerned in the
determination of liability for punitive damages .... Only when the "bad faith" breach
was accompanied by an odious state of mind sufficient to constitute oppression, fraud
or malice will punitive damages be allowed.
Ia (citations omitted).
46. See Diamond, supra note 45, at 433.
47. Id
48. See id at 438.
[It is evident why courts have been reluctant to make the bad faith breach of con-
tract a separate tort. Despite its onerous appellation, the bad faith breach, if defined
as an intentional, wilful, selfishly induced breach of contract, is often an anticipated,
expected and encouraged reality of commercial life .... Further, since conduct is
generally classified as tortious only when it is sufficiently repugnant to be designated
a societal wrong, it would be inappropriate to label an activity that is sanctioned,
even encouraged, as tortious.
Id at 438-39 (footnote omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra
note 30, ch. 16 introductory note at 100.
49. See Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Ef-
ficiency, 24 RTTGERS L. Rtv. 273, 284 (1970); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH & WILLIAM
F. YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 16-18 (4th ed. 1988) (emphasizing im-
portance of efficient breaches to society).
It is in society's interest that each individual reallocate his resources whenever it
makes him better off without making some other unit worse off. Since reallocation
through breach will not make the injured party worse off if his expectations are pro-
tected by preserving his planned allocation of resources, and will, by hypothesis,
make the party in breach better off, it is in society's interest that the contract be
broken and the resources be reallocated.
Id at 17.
50. See Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1118, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128
(1984).
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tract ordinarily does not suffer an injury of such a severe magnitude to
render typical contract remedies of compensation for expense and incon-
venience inadequate.51
Finally, if bad faith conduct in the commercial context is "too
harshly sanctioned, there will be a deterrence not only of breach, but of
the execution of contracts."5 2 The predictability of contract liability
plays an important role in the commercial system. 3 The possibility of
oppressive damages looming over every commercial contract creates a
degree of uncertainty that is inconsistent with the traditional purpose of
contract remedies-to give each party its expectancy.
54
The undisputed exception to the general exclusion of punitive dam-
ages from commercial contract disputes is in the insurance context.5 An
insurer who breaches the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is liable
51. The injury is based on the fungible nature of the goods. In the insurance context,
however, the harm may not be mitigated by turning to the marketplace. The insured is placed
in a unique "economic dilemma" because "[wlhen an insurer takes such actions, the insured
cannot turn to the marketplace to find another insurance company willing to pay for the loss
already incurred." Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 692, 765 P.2d 373, 395,
254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 234 (1988).
In Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158,
206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984), the plaintiff may not have been capable of turning to the market-
place because an unusually severe oil crisis, combined with a federal allocation program, ren-
dered oil an inaccessible commodity, requiring Seaman's to rely on Standard for its continued
operation. However, tort damages were not justified because Seaman's was not barred from
finding another oil supplier to the same extent that an insured is barred from finding another
insurer to pay for a loss already incurred. See infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
In Chief Justice Bird's concurrence and dissent in Seaman's, she argued that because
Seaman's needed the contract with Standard to obtain the lease from the City, and because
Standard knew of Seaman's need for a stable commitment, the parties' expectations did not
include the possibility of a breach. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 781, 686 P.2d at 1175, 206 Cal.
Rptr. at 371 (Bird, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Thus, Chief Justice Bird rea-
soned, under these circumstances Seaman's could recover in tort for Standard's bad faith
breach. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). However, Chief Justice Bird's
reasoning is flawed because "a party to a commercial contract should recognize that a breach
by the other party is always a possibility." Scallen, supra note 41, at 1173. See Rogoff v.
Grabowski, 200 Cal. App. 3d 624, 631, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189-90 (1988), for the proposition
that even when the promisee in a noninsurance contract relies upon the promisor to the extent
that the promisee has nowhere else to turn when the promisor breaches, tort damages are not
justified because the parties' relationship does not possess the characteristics of an insurer-
insured relationship.
52. Diamond, supra note 45, at 437; see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. RFv. 1145, 1208 (1970) (stating that parties are encouraged
to contract because there is freedom to break contracts).
53. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 683, 765 P.2d at 389, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
54. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 30, § 344 cmt. b.
55. See JOHN C. MCCARTHY, PUNmVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES § 1.7, at 25
(5th ed. 1990).
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in tort for punitive damages.5 6 Courts and commentators perceive the
insurer-insured relationship to be special because, while one party is mo-
tivated by profit, the other is motivated by different considerations, such
as peace of mind.57 In ordinary commercial contracts, however, profit is
the primary motivation of both parties.5"
The rationale for imposing tort liability on an insurer for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is based on several
public policy considerations that arise from the special relationship be-
tween insurer and insured. 9 These considerations are: (1) Insurers are
subject to special obligations because they are "purveyors of a vital ser-
vice labeled quasi-public in nature";' (2) insurers "hold themselves out
as fiduciaries"; 61 (3) "the relationship of insurer and insured is inherently
unbalanced";62 (4) "the adhesive nature of insurance contracts places the
insurer in a superior bargaining position";63 and (5) the insured "does
56. In Seaman's, the court cautioned against extending tort liability for breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing beyond parties with "special relationships" to
parties involved in ordinary commercial contracts. For example, in cases involving insurance
contracts, the court has emphasized the "'special relationship' between insurer and insured,
characterized by elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility." Seaman's
Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206
Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984). In commercial contracts, however, "parties of roughly equal bar-
gaining power are free to shape the contours of their agreement." Id. at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167,
206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
Courts have recognized another reason not to extend tort liability beyond parties with a
special relationship. The language in Seaman's that defines the new tort has "striking similari-
ties to the language in prior cases which had defined the tort of breach of an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing as bad faith conduct, extraneous to the contract, with the motive
intentionally to frustrate the enjoyment of contract rights." Rogoff v. Grabowski, 200 Cal.
App. 3d 624, 629-30, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185, 188-89 (1988). Thus, the Seaman's tort may have
been intended to be a subset of the tort of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing applicable only to parties with special relationships. Under such a theory, the Sea-
man's court wrongly applied the new tort to parties involved in a commercial, rather than a
special, relationship.
57. See McCARTHY, supra note 55, at 25.
58. See id.
59. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 819-20, 598 P.2d 452, 456-57, 157
Cal. Rptr. 482, 486-87 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
60. Id at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 487 (quoting William M. Goodman &
Thom G. Seaton, Foreword: Ripe for Decision, Internal Workings and Current Concerns of the
California Supreme Court, 62 CAL. L. REv. 309, 346-47 (1974)). Because the insurer has the
public's trust, it carries the additional responsibility of maintaining that trust. Id.
61. d Inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary is the obligation to act with decency
and humanity. Id.
62. Id Punitive damages are made available in this context in an attempt to restore bal-
ance in the relationship between insurer and insured. Id.
63. Ia; see also Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 768, 686 P.2d at 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362. The
Seaman's court conceded that the reason a tort action is available for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in an insurance contract is that the relationship between the con-
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not seek to obtain a commercial advantage ... he seeks protection... [,]
peace of mind and security.""
Contracts between commercial parties, by contrast, cannot be char-
acterized by any of these considerations." Commercial contracts are not
quasi-public in nature. 6 Contracting commercial parties do not owe a
fiduciary duty to act in one another's financial interests. 7 Inequality of
bargaining power is not common in commercial contracts.6 Moreover,
tracting parties is characterized by elements of "public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary re-
sponsibility." Id.
64. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 819, 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
65. See, eg., White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 900-01, 710 P.2d 309, 327-
28, 221 Cal. Rptr. 509, 527-28 (1985) (Kaus, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice
Kaus stated:
[I]n my view it would be disastrous if every contract were to be subjected to the same
set of rules which we have applied in the context of the insurer-insured relation-
ship.... I just cannot see every person who wilfully breaks a contract subjected to
almost unlimited liability for punitive damages.
Id. (Kaus, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also Charles M. Louderback &
Thomas W. Jurika, Standardsfor Limiting the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F.
L. REv. 187, 227 (1982).
The tort of bad faith should be applied to commercial contracts only if four of the
features characteristic of insurance bad faith actions are present. The features are:
(1) one of the parties to the contract enjoys a superior bargaining position to the
extent that it is able to dictate the terms of the contract; (2) the purpose of the weaker
party in entering into the contract is not primarily to profit but rather to secure an
essential service or product, financial security or peace of mind; (3) the relationship
of the parties is such that the weaker party places its trust and confidence in the
larger entity; and (4) there is conduct on the part of the defendant indicating an
intent to frustrate the weaker party's enjoyment of the contract rights.
Id.; cf C. Delos Putz, Jr. & Nona Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith. Attorney Fees-Not Tort
Liability-Is the Remedy for "Stonewalling" 21 U.S.F. L. REv. 419, 424 (1987) ("The courts
have been understandably reluctant to expand the tort of bad faith beyond insurance
contracts.").
66. See Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 819-20, 598 P.2d at 456-57, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 486-87. When
"parties are, at the outset of their dealings, in an adversarial relationship.., the principal-
fiduciary relationship ...of trust and confidence appears to be lacking." Louderback &
Jurika, supra note 65, at 225.
67. Rickel v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 144 Cal. App. 3d 648, 654, 192 Cal. Rptr. 732, 736
(1983) ("California law is that parties to a contract, by that fact alone, have no fiduciary duties
to one another.").
68. See H. Anthony Miller & R. Wayne Estes, Recent Judicial Limitations on the Right to
Discharge: A California Trilogy, 16 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 65, 90-91 (1982). The Seaman's
court cautioned:
When we move from such special relationships [as that between insurer and insured]
to consideration of the tort remedy in the context of the ordinary commercial con-
tract, we move into largely uncharted and potentially dangerous waters. Here, par-
ties of roughly equal bargaining power are free to shape the contours of their
agreement and to include provisions for attorney fees and liquidated damages in the
event of breach .... This is not to say that tort remedies have no place in such a
commercial context, but that it is wise to proceed with caution in determining their
scope and application.
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the commercial parties seek to obtain a commercial advantage.69
Because the justifications that courts originally used to extend punitive
damages into the insurance contract realm do not apply to commercial
contracts, the imposition of punitive damages on parties to commercial
contracts under Seaman's is inappropriate. 70
III. TREND TOWARD LIMITING THE SEAMAN'S TORT
Although commercial plaintiffs frequently assert Seaman's tort
claims in commercial contract litigation, the growing trend in the Cali-
fornia appellate courts has been to deny recovery for those claims.71
Nonetheless, courts often perform a detailed analysis of Seaman's to ad-
judicate such claims. 2 Perhaps the courts' recent hostility to Seaman's
claims is due to the courts' aversion to engaging in lengthy analyses of
the Seaman's case to interpret the conduct necessary to warrant tort lia-
bility.73 Or, perhaps, the courts dislike the potential for exorbitant puni-
tive damages awards.74 The cases in this section illustrate that, due to
the limitations the courts have placed on Seaman's, it is highly unlikely
that the case would be decided the same way today."
The elements of the tort of bad faith denial of contractual existence
are "(1) an underlying contract, (2) which is breached by the defendant,
(3) who then denies liability by asserting that the contract does not exist,
(4) in bad faith and (5) without probable cause for such denial. ' 7 6 In
addition, some appellate courts require that there be a special relation-
36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363; cf Brian F. Berger, Note, Defining
Public Policy Torts in At- Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L. REv. 153, 165-67 (1981) (stating that
one indicia of unequal bargaining power is use of standardized forms that are not often used in
commercial contracts).
69. See Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128
(1984).
70. Extending the law of bad faith, developed in the insurance context, to the noninsur-
ance context would effectively eliminate the distinctions between contract and tort. See
Louderback & Jurika, supra note 65, at 226-27.
71. See infra notes 79-148 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 79-148 and accompanying text.
73. See Old Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozin-
ski, J., concurring).
74. See iL (Kozinski, J., concurring).
75. See Copesky v. Superior Court, 229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 689, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338, 345
(1991). The Copesky court suggested that the California Supreme Court would not decide
Seaman's the same way today because, since the Seaman's decision, the California Supreme
Court has been reconstituted and has placed a greater emphasis on the separation of contract
and tort remedies. Id. at 688, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 344.
76. Careau & Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1401, 272
Cal. Rptr. 387, 404 (1990).
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ship between the parties.77 The primary elements of the Seaman's tort
that are disputed in the California appellate courts are: (1) the require-
ment that the contract's existence be denied in bad faith and (2) the
requirement of a special relationship.
78
A. What Constitutes a Tortious Bad Faith Denial of Contractual
Existence?
The Seaman's tort has generated confusion among California
courts. Consequently, in recent decisions, almost every court offers a
different interpretation of the tort.79 The one similarity among Califor-
nia decisions, however, is that every court appears to limit the tort's
application. 80
A primary source of confusion created by the Seaman's tort is the
difficult task of distinguishing between a tortious denial of a contract's
existence and a permissible denial of liability under the terms of the con-
tract.81 In fact, some courts have deemed this task "impossible."8 2 As a
result, courts have been reluctant to apply the tort if it appears the de-
fendant has only denied liability under the contract.83
77. See infra notes 131-52 and accompanying text.
78. Careau & Co., 222 Cal. App. 3d at 1401, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
79. See infra notes 84-152 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 84-152 and accompanying text.
81. Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring). For example, when a party's actions and words contradict the terms of a con-
tract, they do not constitute a denial of the existence of the contract, but simply a denial of the
contract's terms. See id (Kozinski, J., concurring).
82. Id (Kozinski, J., concurring). Judge Kozinski explained that the reason this task is
impossible is that "Seaman's gives nary a hint as to how to distinguish a bad faith denial that a
contract exists, from a dispute over contract terms, from a permissible attempt to rescind a
contract, or from 'a loosely worded disclaimer of continued contractual responsibility.'" Id
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (quoting Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 890, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 394, 401 (1984)).
83. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 688-89, 765 P.2d 373, 393, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211, 231 (1988) (clarifying that there is no tort liability for bad faith denial of
liability); see also Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 890-92, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394, 401-
03 (1984) (holding that Seaman's did not require examination of conduct in performance of
contract but only required examination of whether denial of contractual existence had been
asserted). But see Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820
(1986) (recognizing tort remedy for assertion in bad faith of defense to liability, but not for
employer's bad faith denial of employment contract). Koehrer's broad application of Seaman's
was expressly criticized in Foley. The Foley court stated: "By this broad stroke, made without
analyzing the appropriateness of imposing tort remedies in the employment context, the Ko-
ehrer court broached the possibility of obtaining tort damages for the breach of any term of a
contract whether for employment or otherwise." Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 689, 765 P.2d at 393, 254
Cal. Rptr. at 231.
There is one method of bad faith denial of contractual existence that clearly does not
impose tort liability. This is the bad faith denial of contractual existence in a pleading.
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In Elxsi v. Kukje America Corp.," the District Court for the North-
ern District of California explained that the major difficulty confronting
judges trying to apply Seaman's is the faithful interpretation of the Sea-
man's passage identifying the new tort as "denying, in bad faith... that
the contract exists... and... seeking to avoid all liability on a meritori-
ous contract claim.""5 Seaman's, in this passage, described both denial
of the existence of a contract, and denial of the existence of liability.86
The Elxsi court explained that it was difficult to ascertain whether the
Seaman's court intended to impose tort liability on defendants who
threaten to sue on a contract in bad faith and, thus, deny liability under a
contract, or on defendants who deny the existence of a contract.
8 7
Therefore, the Elxsi court faced the dilemma of interpreting the passage
describing the tort as definitional or descriptive.88 If the court found the
passage to be definitional, the words in the passage would be the elements
of the tort.8 9 If the passage, were descriptive, however, it would be
merely dicta explaining conduct that goes beyond mere breach of a con-
tract.90 The court found the passage to be descriptive.91 The court inter-
preted Seaman's as creating a new tort that is "by analogy . . . like
stonewalling and goes beyond mere breach of a contract, but the tortious
conduct itself is the denial that the contract exists."92
"[O]nce litigation has commenced, the actions taken in its defense are not.., probative of
whether [a] defendant in bad faith denied the contractual obligation prior to the lawsuit." Oki
Am., 872 F.2d at 314 (citing Palmer v. Ted Stevens Honda, Inc., 193 Cal. App. 3d 530, 539,
238 Cal. Rptr. 363, 368 (1987)). Although the court in Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia
Co., 880 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1058 (1990), allowed the cause of
action against a defendant who denied the existence of the contract in its answer, this decision
was made without recognizing the holding in Oki America two months earlier. Id at 189.
84. 672 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
85. Id. at 1296 (quoting Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal.
3d 752, 769, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984)).
86. Id. The problem with this "bidefinitional" description of the tort is that it blurs the
analytical distinction between the new tort and bad faith denial of liability under the contract,
which is not tortious. Id at 1297.
87. The Elxsi court stated that "matters would have been far less complicated" if the
California Supreme Court had simply defined the tort as "denying, in bad faith and without
probable cause, that the contract exists." Id at 1296. However, the Elxsi court explained that
the Seaman's court supplemented its definition of the tort by "[r]eferring to an Oregon case






92. Id (emphasis added). The Elxsi court, in this manner, rejected "stonewalling" as suf-
ficient conduct to justify tort liability. Therefore, according to Elxsi, Standard's stonewalling
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In Elxsi, the defendants breached a stock purchase agreement,
falsely claiming that they were acting pursuant to an order from the Ko-
rean Government to cease all pending transactions.93 The defendants
then stopped payment on a check for stock that the plaintiff had already
delivered into escrow. 94 Although the defendants denied liability in bad
faith, the court held that this denial under the contract was not sufficient
to state a Seaman's claim.95
Since Seaman's, several courts have recognized that, although
"stonewalling" is made up of words or conduct that constitute an im-
plied denial of contractual existence, it is not enough to warrant recovery
of punitive damages. 96 For example, in Rogoffv. Grabowski,97 the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal suggested that although the defendant's "mali-
cious" conduct constituted a breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, the plaintiff's "ordeal" did not entitle him to recover puni-
tive damages.98 The plaintiff had rented a limousine from the defendant,
a limousine service, to drive the plaintiff and his wife to a party and back
home.99 Without notice or good cause, the driver left the plaintiff and his
wife at the party "inebriated, clad only in bathing clothes, and with no
means to get home. ' ' 10° The defendant also stole cash and keys from the
wallet that the plaintiff had left in the limousine. 101 Police officers ac-
companied the plaintiff to the defendant's office where the plaintiff saw
his personal belongings thrown about the premises." The defendant re-
conduct in Seaman's would not be sufficient to justify tort liability. But see Multiplex Ins.
Agency v. California Life Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 925, 940, 235 Cal. Rptr. 12, 21 (1987).
The Multiplex court interpreted this passage in Seaman's as definitional. See id The
court stated: "Under Seaman's appellant might be liable for tort damages if appellant denied
any liability 'in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract exists' or denied liabil-
ity 'without probable cause and with no belief in the existence of a defense [(stonewalling)].'"
Id' (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The "alternative theory" asserted in Multiplex, how-
ever, has been "seriously undercut" and the reasoning is not followed in the most recent cases.
DuBarry Int'l v. Southwest Forest Indus., 231 Cal. App. 3d 552, 571, 282 Cal. Rptr. 181, 193
(1991).
93. Elxsi, 672 F. Supp. at 1295.
94. L
95. Id at 1300; see also Martin v. U-Haul Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 396, 412, 251 Cal. Rptr.
17, 25-26 (1988) (holding that licensor's sudden termination of licensee's independent facility
in bad faith and without notice was not bad faith denial of contractual existence).
96. See, eg., Elxsi, 672 F. Supp. at 1297; DuBarry, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 574-75, 282 Cal.
Rptr. at 196; Rogoff v. Grabowski, 200 Cal. App. 3d 624, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1988).
97. 200 Cal. App. 3d 624, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1988).
98. Id at 627, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
99. Id, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 186.




LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:213
fused to return the plaintiff's credit cards until the plaintiff signed the
charge slip that included a $49.00 gratuity for the defendant." 3
The court held that the plaintiff could not recover punitive damages
under Seaman's, despite defendant's stonewalling and the plaintiff's
unusually high reliance on the defendant." The court did not struggle
to apply the Seaman's tort. Instead, the court concluded that a tort rem-
edy was not necessary in this case, notwithstanding the defendant's con-
duct, because the parties had equal bargaining positions.105 Focusing on
the appropriateness of the remedy, rather than on the defendant's con-
duct, the court declared: "The critical factor is that [the plaintiff] has an
adequate remedy for breach of contract."'
10 6
Recently, the court in DuBarry International v. Southwest Forest In-
dustries 10 7 appears to have further limited the scope of the Seaman's tort
to apply only in situations in which there has been an express denial of a
contract's existence.' 08 Southwest, a producer of linerboard, 109 retained
DuBarry to be its exclusive agent to sell its products to Castle & Cooke, a
purchaser of linerboard."° DuBarry was to receive a three percent com-
mission on all sales that it consummated with Castle & Cooke.' On
Southwest's behalf, DuBarry submitted an offer to Castle & Cooke for a
five-year contract that Castle & Cooke accepted.' 12 Pursuant to this
agreement, delivery to Southwest was to be at the port chosen by Castle
& Cooke.' 13 Before drafting the finalized contract, however, Southwest
wrote Castle & Cooke a letter indicating it wanted to ship from a differ-
103. Id.
104. Id at 632, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
105. Id
106. I at 632-33, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 190-91. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated
that the plaintiff's vulnerability in this situation was not a dispositive element because he was
not vulnerable "in the sense of having an inadequate opportunity to obtain substitute perform-
ance or to cover for a breach." Id at 632, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
107. 231 Cal. App. 3d 552, 282 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1991).
108. Acts of repudiation executed in bad faith and inconsistent with the terms of the con-
tract were not
substantial evidence that there was ever a denial by [defendant] of the existence of
the [contract]. As the Supreme Court stated in Seaman's and repeated in Foley, this
new tort is of limited scope.... [Tihe only time that [defendant] even purported to
actually deny the agreement was in its answer to the original complaint.
Id at 574-75, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
109. Linerboard is a product that Castle & Cooke used to make corrugated boxes in which
its food products were shipped. Id at 556, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
110. Id at 556-57, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
111. Id, at 557, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
112. Id. at 557-58, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 184. The court of appeal held that DuBarry had
"consummated" the deal at this point and was deserving of its commission from Southwest.
Id. at 561, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
113. Id. at 558, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
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ent port.114 Castle & Cooke responded by rejecting the contract and all
previous correspondence as "null and void." '115 At trial, the jury found
that an exclusive agency agreement existed between Southwest and
DuBarry and that DuBarry was entitled to damages for Southwest's
breach. 16 It also found that Southwest had denied in bad faith the exist-
ence of the agency agreement and awarded punitive damages to
DuBarry.
117
On appeal, the California Court of Appeal found that Southwest
breached its agreement with DuBarry and that DuBarry should be
awarded its commission." 8 The court conceded that many of South-
west's actions were executed in bad faith. " 9 For example, the presence
of Southwest's agent at the negotiations and Southwest's attempts to
limit the proposals that DuBarry submitted to Castle & Cooke may have
been efforts to deny DuBarry its commission.12 0 With respect to South-
west's actions, however, the court held: "Even assuming this was all
done in bad faith, it amounts to something considerably less than the
denial of the existence of the agency agreement with DuBarry."12 1 Addi-
tionally, the court found that Southwest's telex to DuBarry stating that
DuBarry was not authorized to make the offer it made to Castle & Cooke
was not "evidence of denial of contract existence."122 Instead, the court
stated, "it is evidence to the contrary."1 23 Thus, the court concluded
that the Seaman's tort is "limited to the bad faith denial of the existence
114. Id., 282 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
115. Id at 559, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
116. Id at 560, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 186. The jury awarded DuBarry $1,502,604 for breach of
the agency agreement. Id
117. Id The jury found that the denial of the contract was the legal cause of damages for
DuBarry's lost commission in the amount of $1,502,604. Id Punitive damages were awarded
in the amount of $3,800,000. Id.
118. Id at 562, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 187. The court of appeal found that the jury's determina-
tion of $1,502,604 as the value of DuBarry's lost commission was reasonable. See id, at 563,
282 Cal. Rptr. at 188.
119. Id. at 574, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
120. Id at 573, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
121. Id at 574, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 196. According to the Seaman's court's rationale, South-
west's actions, completely contrary to the terms of the agency agreement, would probably be
considered stonewalling-implied denial of the contract's existence-because Southwest's ac-
tions suggest it treated the contract as null and void. Under the DuBarry rationale, however,
bad faith acts suggesting that one party is treating the contract as null and void are insufficient
to constitute a denial of the contract's existence. See id To maintain a claim for this tort, the
court requires a party to present actual evidence, beyond mere acts, of a denial of a contract's
existence. Id. Thus, under DuBarry, the court appears to require an express denial of contrac-
tual existence to merit tort damages.
122. Id
123. Id.
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of the contract and can not be extended to the assertion of other defenses
to liability." '124 The court emphasized the importance of this distinction
by warning that without it, DuBarry had a "hunting license to capitalize
on every pre-litigation action which Southwest may have taken (1) to
limit and control the negotiating activities of DuBarry and (2) to avoid
exposure to the risk of an unprofitable long term contract with Castle &
Cooke."' 25
Because the DuBarry court required "substantial evidence" of
Southwest's "denial" of the existence of the agency agreement,1 26 the
practical effect of DuBarry appears to be a refined definition of the Sea-
man's tort as an express denial of the contract's existence. 127 After
DuBarry, it is logical to infer that sophisticated commercial parties,
aware that plaintiffs must provide "substantial evidence" of a bad faith
denial of contractual existence to recover in tort, will easily avoid liability
for punitive damages by refraining from expressly denying the contract's
existence. 128 Thus, the difference between extensive liability for punitive
damages and liablilty for mere compensatory damages may depend on
the words the defendant says to the plaintiff rather than on the defend-
ant's conduct.129 As most prospective defendants will learn to avoid ex-
press assertions that the contract does not exist, the DuBarry court, by
apparently narrowing the Seaman's tort to such assertions, has essen-
tially eliminated the tort from commercial contract litigation.
130
124. Id. at 571, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94. The court went on to say that the discussion of
tort liability for a "stonewall" defense in Seaman's should not be given too much weight. Id.
at 567-68, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 191 (citing Careau & Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc.,
222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1397-98 n.22, 272 Cal. Rptr. 387, 400-01 n.22 (1990)). The court
explained that the use of stonewalling in the Seaman's court's description of the tort was
"merely a part of the court's rationale supporting its recognition of the new tort of bad faith
denial of contract existence." Id at 568, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
125. Id at 578, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
126. Id at 574-75, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 196. The court stated: "Whatever the state of the
record with respect to Southwest's assertions regarding contract terms and performance, there
is simply no substantial evidence that there was ever a denial by Southwest of the existence of
the agency agreement." Id.
127. See supra notes 107-26 and accompanying text.
128. The DuBarry court stated that the jury was only permitted to find tort liability if there
was admissible evidence that Southwest had denied the existence of DuBarry's agency con-
tract. DuBarry, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 578, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
129. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
130. The DuBarry court refused to impose tort damages without evidence of Southwest's
denial that the contract existed. DuBarry, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 569, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
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B. The Requirement of a Special Relationship
While the DuBarry court narrowed the application of the Seaman's
tort by requiring "substantial evidence" of a denial of contractual exist-
ence in order to expel it from the commercial contract arena, other
courts require a special relationship in an effort to limit the number of
Seaman's claims in this area.131 The California appellate courts are split
with respect to the special relationship requirement for tort remedies
under Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. 132 This
division stems from the California Supreme Court's warning in Sea-
man's: "When we move from such special relationships [as that between
insurer and insured] to consideration of the tort remedy in the context of
the ordinary commercial contract, we move into largely uncharted and
potentially dangerous waters."
' 133
The First Appellate District in Multiplex Insurance Agency, Inc. v.
California Life Insurance Co. 134 held that no special relationship is neces-
sary for a party to recover in tort for denial of a contract's existence.
135
The Ninth Circuit similarly held, in Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia
Co. ,136 that there is no requirement of a special relationship. 137 Yet, the
Ninth Circuit conceded that the California Supreme Court recently has
"dramatically curtailed the expansion of bad faith liability beyond the
traditional insurer-insured relationship."' 138 The Ninth Circuit appeared
to recognize the need to bar the Seaman's tort from commercial contract
litigation because of its conffict with the policies behind contract law.
139
131. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967); Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984); see also
Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 775 (Mont. 1990) (holding "bad faith tort" applicable
only when parties have special relationship).
132. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). A special relationship in the
contract setting has been articulated as an agreement giving rise to a duty by one or both
parties that "neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive
the benefits of the agreement." Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
133. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 769, 686 P.2d at 1166-67, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 362-63.
134. 189 Cal. App. 3d 925, 235 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1987).
135. Id. at 939-40, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 21; see also Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877,
890, 894-95 n.7, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394, 401, 404-05 n.7 (1984) (Fifth Appellate District rejecting
special relationship requirement). But see Martin v. U-Haul Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 396, 412,
251 Cal. Rptr. 17, 26 (1988) (Fifth Appellate District requiring special relationship before tort
cause of action will lie for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
136. 880 F.2d 176 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying California law), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058
(1990).
137. Id. at 188.
138. Id. at 187.
139. See id.
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It grudgingly held, however, that there is no requirement of a special
relationship:
There is only one way this court could [hold] that the denial of
the existence of a contract in bad faith requires a special rela-
tionship under California law: predict that the California
Supreme Court will overrule its holding in Seaman's.... While
we conclude that California law still recognizes a distinct tort
for the denial of the existence of a contract in bad faith which
does not turn on the presence of a special relationship, our deci-
sion should not be interpreted to endorse the usefulness of the
distinction between denying the existence of a contract and dis-
puting the terms of a contract. We take California law as we
find it. 40
Courts in the Second Appellate District, by contrast, have willingly
imposed a special relationship requirement as a means of "reduc[ing] the
potential for turning every breach of contract dispute into a punitive
damage action."'' The Second Appellate District attempted to confine
the availability of punitive damages to only those plaintiffs who are in
inferior bargaining positions. 42 This district reasoned that the concept
of tort remedies in noninsurance cases is problematic because there is no
special relationship. 43 The problem with Seaman's is that the Seaman's
court based its decision to award tort remedies in the commercial setting
on cases that "relied entirely on insurance cases."" 4  Thus, this district
suggested that the Seaman's court's expansion of the tort to the commer-
cial setting absent a special relationship was inappropriate.145
Although most courts concede that requiring a special relationship
is an effective way to restrict the availability of Seaman's claims,"' the
140. IaL at 188 & n.13.
141. Okun v. Morton, 203 Cal. App. 3d 805, 826, 250 Cal. Rptr. 220, 233 (1988) (rejecting
claim for bad faith denial of contractual existence due to parties' relatively equal bargaining
power).
142. See Rogoff v. Grabowski, 200 Cal. App. 3d 624, 630-33, 246 Cal. Rptr. 185, 188-90
(1988) (refusing to extend Seaman's beyond parties with special relationship because Seaman's
tort is based on principles underlying tort of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, which requires special relationship).
143. See Careau & Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1397-
98, 272 Cal. Rptr. 387, 401-02 (1990) (holding that bank-borrower relationship is not special
relationship).
144. Id at 1396, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
145. See id at 1399, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
146. See, eg., Martin v. U-Haul Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d 396, 415, 251 Cal. Rptr. 17, 28
(1988) (holding that no special relationship exists in franchise agreement between U-Haul
company and franchisee); Rogoff, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 632, 246 Cal. Rptr. at 190 (holding that
there was no special relationship between limousine company and patrons); Quigley v. Pet,
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issue is largely unsettled. 47 Requiring a special relationship may be an
attempt to restrict tort remedies to insurance contracts, in which the in-
volvement of punitive damages in contract litigation originated.
148
The California Supreme Court joined this trend to restrict tort rem-
edies in 1988 with its decision in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 149 The
Foley court refused to extend the tort remedies available in insurance
cases to the employment context in a case in which workers sought puni-
tive damages from their employers, claiming they were fired without
cause in violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.150
Although the court recognized that traditional contract remedies may be
inadequate to compensate employees for certain breaches,151 the court
concluded that "the employment relationship is not sufficiently similar to
that of insurer and insured to warrant judicial extension of the proposed
additional tort remedies in view of the countervailing concerns about
economic policy and stability, [and] the traditional separation of tort and
contract law."
152
The Foley rationale similarly applies to the commercial setting. If
an employment relationship, in which a weaker party relies on a more
powerful party for his or her job, is not sufficiently similar to the special
relationship between insurer and insured to warrant extension of punitive
damages, it follows that a commercial relationship, in which the parties
have roughly equal bargaining power, should not be considered a special
relationship deserving of tort remedies.
Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 892, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394, 403 (1984) (denying tort remedy due to
absence of elements of "public interest, adhesion and fiduciary responsibility").
The Northern District of California has also required plaintiffs to prove a special relation-
ship. See Elxsi v. Kukje Am. Corp., 672 F. Supp. 1294, 1299 (N.D. Cal. 1987). In addition,
other states require a special relationship to prevent tort damages from infecting contract liti-
gation. See infra notes 182-88 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 131-46 and accompanying text.
148. See, eg., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432-34, 426 P.2d 173, 178-79, 58
Cal. Rptr. 13, 18-19 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 661, 328
P.2d 198, 202 (1958).
149. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
150. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
Indeed, the court even suggested that any extension of tort remedies to noninsurance
cases is not justified given (1) the limited purpose and scope of contract damages,
(2) the strong need in our commercial system for predictability of the cost of contrac-
tual relationships and (3) the difficulty of formulating a workable test for distinguish-
ing between a simple breach of contract and a "tortious' breach ....
Careau & Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1399, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 387, 402 (1990) (emphasis added) (citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d
654, 683, 699-700, 765 P.2d 373, 389, 400-01, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 227, 238-39 (1988)).
151. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 694, 765 P.2d at 397, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
152. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35.
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IV. GROWING AvERSION TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES
IN CONTRACT ACTIONS
A. Recent Limitations on Tort Remedies in the Commercial Context
In 1991 the Fourth Appellate District of California t1 3 and the Ninth
Circuit15 followed the trend set by Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. and
refused to extend punitive damages to commercial contracts outside the
insurance realm. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that a contract without the
element of unequal bargaining power and without fiduciaries involved
does not present public policy concerns that would justify allowing addi-
tional tort damages under Foley. 5
The Fourth Appellate District viewed Foley as a change in direction
away from tort recovery for breach of commercial contracts.15 6 Al-
though the court in Copesky v. Superior Court 157 acknowledged that pu-
nitive damages are still arguably recoverable for the Seaman's tort, the
Copesky court insisted that business relationships are no longer amenable
to tort actions for any contract breaches outside the insurance context.
1 58
The Copesky court stated:'
There is no question but that the decision in Foley redirects the
course of law in the area of tort recovery for breach of commer-
cial contracts. While some may argue that the Seaman's tort of
bad faith denial of the existence of a contract remains viable,
... there is only one category of business transactions which
definitionally is amenable to tort actions for contract breaches,
and that is insurance. 59
153. See Copesky v. Superior Court, 229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 689-90, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338, 345
(1991) (holding that no tort remedy exists for breach of commercial banking contract due to
absence of special relationship).
154. See Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 207 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that
no tort remedy exists for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing because of
absence of special relationship).
155. Id at 208.
156. See Copesky, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 689-90, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
157. 229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 280 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1991).
158. a at 689, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 345; see also Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 213 Cal. App. 3d
465, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1989) (holding that borrower cannot recover against bank in tort for
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). "The impact of the Foley decision
cannot be assessed with certainty.... The decision surely precludes the sort of loose extension
of tort recovery, based on 'quasi-fiduciary' relationship, sanctioned in [earlier cases]." Id. at
478, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 741. In this manner, the relationship between Seaman's and Standard
cannot be considered different from any other relationship between commercial contracting
parties.
159. Copesky, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 689, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 345; see also Oki Am., Inc. v.
Microtech Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (explaining
trend toward limiting tort remedies in noninsurance settings). Judge Kozinski declared:
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Both the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Appellate District are changing
directions and excluding punitive damages remedies from commercial
contract actions.
B. Growing Aversion to Punitive Damages for Bad Faith Denial of
Contractual Existence
Recently, courts and commentators"6 have expressed serious
doubts about the viability of the Seaman's tort. In 1989 Judge Kozinski
vented his frustration with the application of the Seaman's tort: "In in-
venting the tort of bad faith denial of a contract the California Supreme
Court has created a cause of action so nebulous that it more resembles a
brick thrown from a third story window than a rule of law." 16' Judge
Kozinski viewed the Seaman's tort as entangling courts in the negotia-
tions between corporations and other business parties-a role the slow-
moving courts are ill-suited to play.' 62 In addition, the possibility of a
Seaman's claim may actually prevent a business from functioning effi-
ciently if every business decision must be carefully weighed against the
risk of an "exotic" Seaman's claim and "incalculable damages."' 63
Moreover, Judge Kozinski asserted that Seaman's is a "prime candidate"
for reversal by the California Supreme Court. 6'
In 1990 the Second Appellate District lamented the effect the Sea-
man's tort has had on contract litigation. In Lynch & Freytag v.
Cooper,6 ' the plaintiff asserted a claim for bad faith denial of contractual
existence in a dispute involving only the construction of the contract be-
tween the parties. In this case, the plaintiff, a sublessor of office space,
sued the defendant sublessee to recover rent.' 66 The defendant disputed
a provision in the contract relating to the method of calculating the cost-
Fortunately, the tide seems to be turning. ... Foley has taken a bite out of
Seaman's by holding that tort remedies are not available for breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an employment contract.... At long last
... we seem to be moving in the right direction.
Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
160. See Putz & Klippen, supra note 65, at 499; Scallen, supra note 41, at 1197-98.
161. OkiAm., 872 F.2d at 315 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Judge Kozin-
ski's view was cited with approval in Copesky, 229 Cal. App. 3d at 687 n.6, 280 Cal. Rptr. at
343 n.6.
162. 872 F.2d at 316 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
163. Ia (Kozinski, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 317 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
165. 218 Cal. App. 3d 603, 267 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1990).
166. Id at 606, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
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of-living increase in monthly rent. 67 The amount of the dispute was
$7.84 a month.'68 The court complained that due to
the allure of punitive damages... [t]he parties... have man-
aged to escalate a dispute over $7.84 a month into a superior
court case that has lasted nearly five years, consumed an esti-
mated 400 hours of attorney time, used four days of trial time,
produced four volumes of clerk's transcript... and resulted in
two appeals and five appellate briefs. Something is wrong. At a
time when many indigent civil litigants must go without coun-
sel.., it is unconscionable for highly skilled attorneys to have
used their time and resources to litigate a case over $7.84 a
month. '
69
Judge Woods furthered this sentiment in his concurrence. He inter-
preted the decision in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 170 as a refusal to
extend the Seaman's tort to the employer-employee relationship.171 As a
result of the Foley decision, he stated, the Seaman's tort is not applicable
to commercial contract relationships such as those between sublessor and
sublessee. 172 Furthermore, Judge Woods asserted that after Foley, the
"general viability of Seaman's ... appears to be tenuous at best." 173
In 1991 the Fourth Appellate District also noted that the Seaman's
tort of bad faith denial of the existence of a contract may no longer be a
"viable" tort.' 74 In addition, the Second Appellate District's recent
holding in DuBarry International v. Southwest Forest Industries 175 sug-
gests that the Seaman's tort is no longer applicable to commercial con-
tract disputes. 176 The court intimated that even if there had been a bad
faith denial of the existence of the contract, there was no evidence that, if
such conduct occurred, it caused the plaintiff any damages beyond those
167. Id
168. Id The sublessee denied the existence of the sublease contract in the complaint. How-
ever, the court held that a Seaman's claim is not available to plaintiffs when defendants deny
the existence of a contract in their answers to complaints. Id at 610, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
169. Id at 614, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 196.
170. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988); see supra notes 149-52 and
accompanying text.
171. Lynch & Freytag, 218 Cal. App. 3d at 616, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 197 (Woods, J.,
concurring).
172. Id (Woods, J., concurring).
173. Id (Woods, J., concurring).
174. See Copesky v. Superior Court, 229 Cal. App. 3d 678, 689, 28 Cal. Rptr. 338, 345
(1991).
175. 231 Cal. App. 3d 552, 282 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1991).
176. See supra notes 107-30 and accompanying text.
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that were granted for breach of contract.177 In this case, all of the plain-
tiff's losses were fully compensated by the award of contract damages. 178
The court held that to recover more than contract damages would
wrongly allow the plaintiff to recover twice. 179  Therefore, under
DuBarry, a plaintiff who sues for breach of contract and bad faith denial
of contractual existence may only recover contract damages. Only if the
plaintiff can prove completely distinguishable losses on the tort claim
may the plaintiff recover additional damages. 80 Given the recent deci-
sion in DuBarry guarding against double recovery, 8' it is difficult to im-
agine any commercial contract scenarios in which the recovery of tort
damages would be allowed under Seaman's.
C. Little Support for Seaman's Outside California
Montana is the only state besides California that recognizes the tort
of bad faith in typical arms-length commercial contracts. 182 Yet, in Story
v. City of Bozeman, 83 the Montana Supreme Court recently limited the
tort of bad faith to disputes between parties with special relationships.' 84
The court reasoned that punitive damages for ordinary contracting par-
ties are excessive because the function of a tort remedy is to discourage
oppression in contracts that necessarily give one party a superior posi-
tion. 85 The court recognized that punitive damages contaminate con-
tract litigation because the evidence involved in tort litigation is far more
extensive than that involved in traditional contract litigation.' 86 The
177. DuBarry, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 563-64, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 188. The court stated: "[I]n
this case the only damage evidence offered related to lost commissions. There was no attempt
to show that Southwest's alleged bad faith denial of the agency contract's existence had caused
DuBarry any damages beyond those already claimed for the breach of that contract." Id at





182. Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 773-74 (Mont. 1990). Other states recognize
the tort in more limited circumstances. For example, Arizona acknowledges a tort remedy if
contracting parties have a special relationship and one party intentionally breaches the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. See Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 576 (Ariz. 1986).
Idaho recognizes a tort remedy in the insurance contract context because of the special rela-
tionship between insurer and insured. See Hettwer v. Farmers Ins. Co., 797 P.2d 81, 84
(Idaho 1990). Alaska does not recognize a tort remedy in any contract case unless a party's
conduct rises to the level of a traditionally recognized tort, such as intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See Arco Alaska, Inc. v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Alaska 1988).
183. 791 P.2d 767 (Mont. 1990).
184. Id. at 775.
185. Id. at 775-76.
186. Id at 774.
November 1992]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
court exhorted that the imposition of a bad faith tort on contract litiga-
tion affords an opportunity for damages so significantly higher than the
damages involved in a garden variety contract case that the "'tort tail'
has begun to wag the 'contract dog.' "187 Furthermore, the Montana
Supreme Court noted that the Montana state legislature's recent ban on
punitive damages in contract actions suggests that such damages are not
appropriate in ordinary contract actions. 188
VI. PROPOSAL
A. Eliminate the Seaman's Tort
The Seaman's tort should be eliminated from the commercial con-
tract setting. California courts have avoided applying the tort, looking
for justifications to restrict its applicability."8 9 To decide how to restrict
the tort, courts have engaged in detailed analyses of Seaman's Direct
Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. 190 and its progeny 91 at the ex-
pense of judicial efficiency.192 Courts have spent time and resources try-
ing to distinguish a contract squabble from a tort, although "Seaman's
gives nary a hint as to how to distinguish a bad faith denial that a con-
tract exists ... from a permissible attempt to rescind a contract."1 93 In
fact, the distinction is so difficult to determine that judges are given "li-
cense to rely on their gut feelings."' 94
Juries, likewise, are confused. "Instead of concentrating on perti-
nent issues such as offer, acceptance, breach, and mistake, the jury is
faced with evidence of moral wrongdoing and punitive damages-evi-
187. Id. at 772.
188. Id. at 775.
189. See supra notes 79-148 and accompanying text.
190. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
191. See supra notes 79-148 and accompanying text.
192. See Old Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int'l, 872 F.2d 312, 316 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring). Judge Kozinski lamented:
But the case drags on, kept alive by Microtech's vain hope of parlaying a business
squabble into a $3.1 million gold mine. The judicial machinery keeps churning,
fueled by the energies of the lawyers, the parties... and other myriad components of
the judicial process. One shudders to imagine the resources that would be consumed
in adjudicating a more colorable Seaman's case.
Id (Kozinski, J., concurring).
193. Oki Am., 872 F.2d at 315 (Kozinski, J., concurring). In addition, Judge Kozinski
explained, "[t]he test-if one can call it such-seems to be whether the conduct 'offends ac-
cepted notions of business ethics."' Id. (Kozinski, J., concurring) (quoting Seaman's Direct
Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 770, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 363 (1984)). The ambiguity of this test was also criticized in Careau & Co. v.
Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 3d 1371, 1401-02 n.27, 272 Cal. Rptr.
387, 404-05 n.27 (1990).
194. Oki Am., 872 F.2d at 315 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
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dence that may be misleading and inflammatory in contract litiga-
tion." 195 Juries tend to overlook the traditional contract law concept
that parties are free to breach their contracts and pay contract damages
whenever performance is not economically efficient.196 As a result, ju-
ries often award damages that are inappropriately excessive. 
197
The Seaman's tort not only confuses the courts, it crowds court
dockets. The number of potential claims in any contract action has in-
flated to include not only traditional breach of contract claims, 198 but
tort claims that delay and complicate often simple contract litigation.' 99
Judge Kozinski declared that
[t]his tortification of contract law-the tendency of contract
disputes to metastasize into torts-gives rise to a new form of
entrepreneurship: investment in tort causes of action. "If
Pennzoil won $11 billion from Texaco, why not me?" That
thought must cross the minds of many enterprising lawyers and
businessmen.2 'o
To eliminate the Seaman's tort from commercial contract actions,
the California Supreme Court must overrule Seaman's. At least one for-
mer member of the California Supreme Court agrees that the Seaman's
tort should not apply in the commercial setting. Justice Kaus insisted
that urgent action should be taken against the "disastrous" application of
punitive damages outside the insurance area.20' Justice Kaus recom-
mended legislation to resolve the Seaman's problem.2' 2 However, de-
spite past legislation prohibiting recovery of punitive damages in contract
actions,2"3 the courts have continued to regard Seaman's and the cases
195. Story v. City of Bozeman, 791 P.2d 767, 774 (Mont. 1990).
196. Id.
197. See kL
198. See Oki Am, 872 F.2d at 315 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
199. See id (Kozinski, J., concurring).
200. d (Kozinski, J., concurring).
201. See White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 900, 710 P.2d 309, 327, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 509, 527 (1985) (Kaus, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
202. d at 901, 710 P.2d at 328, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
203. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1992) (punitive damages may not be re-
covered in action for breach of contract); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS,
supra note 30, § 355 cmt. b (punitive damages proper in contract actions only if proper under
independent tort law). Section 3300 of the California Civil Code states:
For the breach of an obligation arising from contract, the measure of damages, ex-
cept where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will com-
pensate the party aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or
which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result therefrom.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West 1970); cf Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital
Data Sys., 708 F.2d 385, 399 (9th Cir. 1983). The Consolidated court asserted: "[P]unitive
damages are not available under California law for mere breaches of contract, no matter how
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following it as the sole authority, even though a limited one, on the issue
of punitive damages for bad faith denial of the existence of a contract.2°
Therefore, the California courts are awaiting an answer from the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, not the California legislature.
B. Modify Traditional Rules of Contract Damages
Commentators have suggested that contract damage awards have
been insufficient in cases involving bad faith breaches of commercial con-
tracts, leaving the promisee undercompensated. 05 For example, in Sea-
man's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,206 the jury
awarded Seaman's only $397,050 in compensatory damages for breach of
contract.2 ' 7 In contrast, the jury awarded Seaman's $11,058,810 in puni-
tive damages.2 °0 Awarding punitive damages to a plaintiff who is not
made "whole"2 "9 by ordinary contract damages, however, is going "over-
board" in the other direction.210 Modifying traditional rules of contract
damages to include costs of litigation, provable lost profits of a new busi-
ness and other losses directly resulting from bad faith denial of a contract
is more consistent with the policies behind contract law than is the exten-
sion of tort remedies into contract law.
211
Contracting parties who deny-in bad faith-the existence of a con-
tract should be liable for all damages proximately caused and resulting
from such conduct. For example, the breaching party should not only be
liable for compensatory damages but also for the injured party's attor-
ney's fees because the non-breaching party does not expect to incur attor-
ney's fees from the transaction.
By making the range of iablility for a breach foreseeable to the
breaching party, commercial parties will not be discouraged from eco-
nomically efficient breaches that benefit the commercial system and soci-
gross or willful." Id (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1992); Miller v. National
Am. Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 331, 336-37, 126 Cal. Rptr. 731, 733 (1976)).
204. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 689 n.28, 765 P.2d 373, 393-94
n.28, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 232 n.28 (1988) for Justice Broussard's proposition that by engaging
in a new interpretation of Seaman's, the California Supreme Court would not need to radically
restructure the law.
205. See, eg., Scallen, supra note 41, at 1185-86.
206. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
207. Id at 762, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
208. Id.
209. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3302 (West 1970) (detriment caused by breach of obligation to
pay money is amount due under terms of obligation with interest thereon).
210. See White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal. 3d 870, 901, 710 P.2d 309, 328, 221 Cal.
Rptr. 509, 528 (Kaus, 3., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
211. See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
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ety.21 2 In addition, this form of compensation would not disadvantage
the victim of the bad faith denial of contractual existence. The victim of
the bad faith conduct would be made "whole" and, thus, his or her ex-
pectations would be satisfied.2 13 Anything more, such as an excessive
award of punitive damages, would be a windfall to the plaintiff-far be-
yond both the plaintiff's and the defendant's wildest expectations.
VII. CONCLUSION
The presence of the Seaman's tort in the commercial contract at-
mosphere undermines the basic principles behind contract law.
Although some non-breaching parties may not be made whole by con-
tract damages alone, awards of punitive damages are not the answer. In
fact, the recent decision in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 214 suggests that
the California Supreme Court would be receptive to a challenge asserting
that punitive damages for bad faith denial of contractual existence upsets
expectations involved in commercial bargaining. Foley took the first step
toward eliminating punitive damage awards from contract litigation be-
tween parties without a special relationship. A growing distaste for the
Seaman's tort among the California appellate districts, in the Ninth Cir-
cuit and in other states mandates that the California Supreme Court take
one step further and overrule Seaman's.
Dana Rae Landsdorf*
212. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. If the threat of tort liability prevents
commercial parties from efficiently breaching contracts, the additional costs to commercial
entities that could be avoided by an efficient breach may be passed on to the consumer. In
addition, the funds necessary to satisfy potential punitive damage awards may be collected
from consumers through increased prices of goods and services.
213. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRACTs, supra note 30, § 344 cmt. b.
214. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
* To Mom and Robert who encouraged, loved and listened.
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